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“Bricks vs. Clicks”: different channel structures for remarketing remanufactured goods

The current remanufacturing research focuses mainly on different technology, production planning, and inventory control. We provide an alternative and somewhat complementary approach that considers remarketing-related issues, such as different remarketing costs, consumer preferences and remarketing channel structures. Specifically, based on observations from current practice, we consider a manufacturer who has two options for remarketing remanufactured products: (1) she can remarket those through hers own e-channel (Model M), or (2) she can subcontract the remarketing activity to a third party (Model 3P). We find that, although the manufacturer usually sets a lower wholesale price in Model M, the reseller, who sells the new products through his retail channel, usually provides a lower volume of new units. More important, we show that, although Model M is always greener than Model 3P, firms may not have an incentive to adopt it because, compared to subcontracting the remarketing activity to the third party, both the manufacturer and the reseller may actually be worse off when the manufacturer remarketing the remanufactured products through hers own e-channel. In addition, we extend both models to the cases where the manufacturer interacts with multiple resellers, as our analysis reveals, the more resellers in the market, Model M is more green than Model 3P.
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1. Introduction
Interest in the management of remanufacturing has increased noticeably in the last ten years, for a variety of reasons, including an increase in the awareness of sustainability and the pressure from customers and environmental regulations (Savaskan and Van Wassenhove 2006). However, the current remanufacturing research focuses mainly on logistics, production planning, and inventory control (Fleischmann et al. 1997; Debo et al. 2005) and pays little attention to remarketing-related issues, such as remarketing channel structure, remarketing costs and cannibalization problems between remanufactured products and new ones. But, of course, remarketing remanufactured units in parallel with the new products poses a number of issues for distribution channels decisions. For instance, remanufactured products are often offered at a reduced price, which raises the concern that such products may cannibalize sales of higher margin new products; as a result, many firms do not offer remanufactured products together with new ones (Ovchinnikov 2011). To highlight the strategic nature of the decisions about remarketing distribution channels that are made by the manufacturer, consider the following examples.
The manufacturer usually sells the remanufactured products via a manufacturer-owned e-channel Web sites, as well as auction sites such as eBay, or the authorized third party distributors (Ferguson and Souza 2010). For example, after collecting the used fashion electronic products from customers and replacing parts for any defective modules identified in testing, all refurbished​[1]​ Apple computers and notebooks are sold via Apple’s online Store (Apple 2013). Similarly, customers can find refurbished products at the Canon Online Store where a wide variety of its top name brand product groups, including EOS Digital SLR Cameras, PowerShot Digital Cameras, PIXMA Printers, and VIXIA Camcorders (Canon 2013). Similar activities are undertaken by Hewlett Packard Corporation for refurbished computers and refurbished business products and by Sony for cameras and laptops. 
In addition to the form of distribution that involves a manufacturer selling the remanufactured products via hers​[2]​ own e-channel, there is a second form in which the manufacturer remarkets the remanufactured products via an authorized third party distributor. This is the case of Panasonic, which has three authorized service centers, such as Telrepco, Buy Tough and Rugged Depot, and all the remanufactured Toughbook computers are sold by authorized reseller partners (Panasonic 2013). And we also find that this form of distribution is common in the automobile industry, the manufacturer normally adopts car reseller to market her new parts, while her rebuilt parts are usually available through some auto repair shops and auto parts chain stores.
These examples suggest that the remarketing channels chosen by manufacturers are quite different from one another. To investigate how the decisions about distribution channels that are made by the manufacturer and their impacts on environmental performance, based on observations from current practice, we consider two remarketing channel formats for remanufactured products: (1) a manufacturer sells new units through an independent reseller, while all remanufactured products are remarketed through hers own e-channel (Model M), (2) a manufacturer sells new units through an independent reseller, while she contracts the sales of remanufactured products to a third party distributor (Model 3P).
More specifically, in this paper, we try to explore the following research questions:
(1)	How should a manufacturer remarket the remanufactured products to market, in particular, whether to remarket the remanufactured products through hers own e-channel or the third party distributor? 
(2)	What are the roles of channel structure, remarketing costs and cannibalization problems between remanufactured products and new ones?
(3)	How do the remarketing channel structures affect both parties’ optimal strategies and the environmental performance?
Our model shows that although the manufacturer usually sets a lower wholesale price in Model M, the reseller, who sells the new products through his retail channel, usually provides a lower volume of new units. Moreover, we find that, although Model M is always greener than Model 3P, firms may not have an incentive to adopt it because, compared to subcontracting the remarketing activity to the third party, both the manufacturer and the reseller may actually be worse off when the manufacturer remarketing the remanufactured products through hers own e-channel. In addition, our analysis reveals that the more resellers in the market, Model M is more green than Model 3P.
Our overall contribution is threefold. First, we address an aspect mostly ignored by extant research in remanufacturing area: the fact that manufacturers have the potential flexibility to choose different distribution channels to remarket the remanufactured products. Said differently, instead of focusing on how do the product return costs, rates and qualities influence the players optimal strategies, we provide an alternative and somewhat complementary approach that how the different remarketing channels structures impact on all players’ optimal strategies when putting remanufactured products on the market together with new products. Second, although the question of whether remanufacturing results in environmentally worse or improves the environmental performance has been well studied in remanufacturing literature; remarketing-related issues aside, little is known about how the remarketing costs, remarketing channel structure and cannibalization problem between new products and remanufactured units can affect this issue. In this paper, we analyze the importance of such factors in shaping both parties’ policies and impacting on the environmental performance. Third, on a broader level, this paper contributes to understand how the decisions about remarketing channels that are made by the manufacturer and to account for the strategic effects of remarketing costs, channel structure and cannibalization problems and also provide insights for the environmental performance of these decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the related literature and explain our contributions in more detail. Section 3 describes the key elements of our basic model and introduces notations. Section 4 outlines two models—Model M and Model 3P—and reports our main findings. Section 5 extends both models to the cases where the manufacturer interacts with multiple resellers. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Relevant Literature
Remanufacturing has long been studied, especially in the closed-loop supply chain literature, where has taken one of two familiar tacks. The first assumed that the manufacturer undertakes all activities, including producing, remanufacturing, marketing and remarketing, in an integrated system. For example, an earlier study by Debo et al. (2005) adopts a multi-period model to analyze the market and technology drivers of product remanufacturability in a remanufacturing environment. Subsequently, Ferguson and Toktay (2006) discuss a manufacturer’s recovery strategy in the face of a competitive threat on the remanufactured product market. They conclude that the manufacturer may choose to preemptively collect its used products to deter entry, even when the firm would not have chosen to do so under a pure monopoly environment. Meanwhile, Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) address the issue of remanufacturing in monopoly and duopoly environments for two-period, multi-period and infinite-horizon settings. Later, Atasu et al. (2008) consider the existence of green segments, original equipment manufacturer competition, and product life-cycle effects in a remanufacturing context. Recently, Ovchinnikov (2011) investigates pricing and remanufacturing strategy of a firm that decides to offer both new and remanufactured versions of its product in the market and is concerned with demand cannibalization. In contrast to these studies, we allow the manufacturer to interact with her resellers for new products selling and to choose whether to remarket the remanufactured products through hers own e-channel or through an authorized third party distributor.
The second research stream allows the manufacturer interact with her resellers when she marketing and/or remarketing the products. For instance, Savaskan et al. (2004) investigate a manufacturer’s reverse channel choice in a single-manufacturer, single-retailer supply chain structure, and Savaskan and Van Wassenhove (2006) extended their own research by focusing on the interaction between a manufacturer’s reverse channel choice to collect postconsumer goods and the strategic product pricing decisions in the forward channel when retailing is competitive. Guide et al. (2006) then present a network flow with delay models that includes the marginal value of time to identify the drivers of reverse supply chain design. Qiang et al. (2013) further investigate a closed-loop supply chain network model which consisted of raw material suppliers, manufacturers, and retail outlets. While, Ma et al. (2013) focus on how consumption-subsidy influences dual-channel closed-loop supply chain and show that the consumption-subsidy is conducive to the expansion of closed-loop supply chain which leads to both the manufacturer and the retailer are beneficiaries of the consumption-subsidy. All these literatures take the structure of the remarketing distribution system as a given and pay little attention to the remarketing distribution structures. We, however, allow the manufacturer the option of choosing different distribution channels to remarket the remanufactured products. Moreover, instead of focusing on how do the product return costs, rates and qualities influence the players optimal strategies, we provide an alternative and somewhat complementary approach that considers remarketing-related issues, such as remarketing costs, remarketing channel structure and cannibalization problems.
Our work is also closely related to the literature in marketing, operations and economics that are associated with use of different distribution channels. In particular, Cachon and Lariviere (2005), Caldieraro and Coughlan (2007), Jeuland and Shugan (2008), Cai (2010), and Yan (2011) focus on the competition between manufacturer and intermediaries in distribution channels and propose many coordination policy remedies to eliminate the competition between both parties. On the other hand, in recent years, there is a growing amount of literature on dual-channel management which focuses on competition between manufacturer-owned e-channels and the independent resellers (see, e.g., Chiang et al. 2003; Tsay and Agrawal 2004; Arya et al. 2007; Webb and Lambe 2007; Chun et al. 2011; Xiong et al. 2012). Instead of using intermediaries and/or e-channels to market the new products, we focus on the environment of the manufacturer chooses different distribution channels to remarket remanufactured products.
3. Model Assumptions and Notation
Based on observations from current practice, we consider two distribution channel formats for remanufactured products: (1) a manufacturer sells new units through an independent reseller, while all remanufactured products are remarketed through hers own e-channel (Model M, Fig. 1a), (2) a manufacturer sells new units through an independent reseller, while she contracts the sales of remanufactured products to a third party distributor (Model 3P, Fig. 1b). 
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Fig. 1 Two Distribution Channel Models

	We introduce our assumptions concerning the distribution cost, consumer preferences and decision making framework as follows:
Assumption 1. In all our supply chain models, all players have access to the same information, the sequence of events in all models is as follows: the manufacturer announces the wholesale prices of both products, the reseller responds by determining the optimal units of selling, and the manufacturer and/or third party distributor then chooses the units to be sold through the e-channel and/or through the third party channel.
	The assumption of all players have access to the same information allows us to control for inefficiencies and risk-sharing issues resulting from information asymmetry (Corbett and de Groote 2000; Savaskan et al. 2004). The similar sequence of events has been widely used in the supply chain literature (see, e.g., Arya et al. 2007; Xiong et al. 2012).
Assumption 2. The cores for remanufacturing only derived from new product sales, said differently, any given unit only has two lives: once as a new product and once as a remanufactured product.
	Although assumption 2 precludes the realistic possibility that the manufacturer could extract remanufacture cores from the remanufactured products, this restriction is consistent with the background of this paper: in electronic industries, cores obtained from remanufactured products were usually built on previous technology and should be obsolete, thus, few firms do extract remanufacture cores from the remanufactured products. And we also note that, in remanufacturing literature, Savaskan et al. (2004), Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006), Agrawal et al. (2011) and Xiong et al. (2013) use similar restriction to investigate the issues created by remanufacturing.
Assumption 3. Marginal cost to product a new product is  and the marginal cost to make a remanufactured product is , to ensure that making a remanufactured product is less costly than producing a new one, we assume that .
The assumption of remanufacturing has a cost advantage than manufacturing a new one is quite common in previous research (e.g., Savaskan et al. 2004; Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006; Xiong et al. 2013). To characterize remanufacturing has a cost advantage than manufacturing, we assume that the marginal cost to make a remanufactured product is . Similar assumption has been widely used in the marketing literature (see, e.g., Arya et al. 2007; Arya et al. 2008; Xiong et al. 2012). In addition, this assumption enables us to abstract away other issues and focus solely on how the decisions about remarketing distribution channels that are made by the manufacturer and the effect of remarketing costs, channel structure and cannibalization problems.
Assumption 4. The unit cost of selling a new product by reseller is ; while the unit cost of selling a remanufactured product by the manufacture-owned e-channel and/or the third party is .
Obviously, we divide the cost of remanufacturing into two parts: the cost of making a remanufactured product (included costs of collecting cores and remanufacturing) and the cost of remarketing a remanufactured product. Since this assumption is a departure from previous literature in which remanufacturing cost is usually divided into the cost of collecting cores and the cost of making a remanufactured product (e.g, Savaskan et al. 2004; Ferguson and Toktay 2006; Savaskan and Van Wassenhove 2006), it deserves an extended explanation.
Indeed, remanufacturing typically involves two steps. First, all cores must be collected from the new products sold in the market; and second, all the collected cores should be reprocessed, including testing, cleaning, and replacing of parts. In this paper, instead of focusing on how do different technology and production planning influence the players optimal strategies, we provide an alternative and somewhat complementary approach that considers marketing-related issues of how the remarketing distribution channels structure and remarketing cost impact on all players’ optimal strategies and the environmental performance. Obviously, by developing a model in which unit cost of selling a new product is different from the unit cost of remarketing a remanufactured product, we are able to investigate a manufacturer’s rationale on how the decisions about remarketing distribution channels that are made by the manufacturer when putting remanufactured products on the market together with new products.
Assumption 5. A consumer owns at most one product, whether new or remanufactured product. The size of the consumer population is assumed not to change over time and is normalized to 1.
Assumption 6. Consumer willingness-to-pay for a new product is heterogeneous and uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1].
Assumption 7. Primary consumer value discount for the remanufactured product is a fraction () of the willingness-to pay for the new product.
Assumptions 5, 6 and 7 are consistent with the literature steam of remanufacturing (e,g., Ferguson and Toktay 2006; Atasu et al. 2008; Ferrer and Swaminathan 2010; Agrawal et al. 2011). From assumptions 5, 6 and 7, we can derive the inverse demand functions for new and remanufactured products from the consumer utility functions as follows. We refer the reader to Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) for the detailed derivation. 
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Assumptions 6 and 7 give rise to a vertical differentiation model where every consumer prefers a new product to a remanufactured product (Tirole 1988). Note that primary consumer value discount for the remanufactured product, which represents how well a product holds up when it acts as a remanufactured product, contributes to the cannibalization problem between remanufactured and new units. For example, if , consumers are willing to pay nothing for any remanufactured product. If , consumers view the remanufactured and new units as being identical and thus they are willing to pay the same amount for the remanufactured product as the valuation of new units.
This lower willingness-to pay model thus reflects certain key characteristics when putting remanufactured products on the market together with new products. First, it reflects the fact that customer concerns about quality of the remanufactured products. For example, many manufacturers, including Apple, Canon, Hewlett Packard and Panasonic, provide a much shorter warranty for the refurbished products than their new counterparts, which leads to consumer willingness-to-pay for a remanufactured product less than that for a new one and consumers would expect that the remanufactured units are not as good as new products. Second, it reflects the fact that, because making a remanufactured product is less costly than producing a new one, consumers want that reflected in the price. For example, remanufacturers of short life-cycle consumer products like cell phones and DVD players are most concerned with the availability of competing low-cost, more technologically sophisticated new products (Williamson et al. 2012).
Assumption 8. In all our supply chain models, all decisions are considered in a single-period setting.
	As in Savaskan et al. (2004) and Ma et al. (2013), to focus on the average supply chain profits per period and to making a clear comparison among our models, we assume the previous existence of the product in the market and those products sold in the previous periods can be returned to the manufacturer for reuse.
4. Model Formulation and Solution
In this section, we consider two distribution channel formats of Model M and Model 3P. We use  to represent the profit for the player  under supply chain model , that is, superscript denotes Model M and Model 3P, respectively. Subscript  denotes the manufacturer, the reseller, the third party and the total supply chain, respectively.
4.1. Model M
In this model, the manufacturer sells new units through an independent reseller, while all remanufactured products are remarketed through hers own e-channel. An example of this form of supply chain structure is Apple’s remarketing channel for her remanufactured computers and notebooks. Specifically, after collecting the used products from customers and replacing parts for any defective modules identified in testing, all refurbished Apple computers and notebooks are sold via Apple’s online Store. Similar activities are undertaken by Canon, Hewlett Packard Corporation and Sony.
In model M, the manufacturer can sell the remanufactured products through the e-channel directly. Therefore, the manufacturer’s problem is
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Given the wholesale price () and anticipating the manufacturer’s response , the reseller’s problem is
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We solve problems using backward induction to determine the subgame perfect equilibrium, that is, we first solve the manufacturer’s maximization problem with respect to . The reseller then maximizes his profit by choosing the selling units , and, at last, the manufacturer can do so by choosing the wholesale price . The following proposition summarizes both parties’ optimal decisions​[3]​. 





 In the following section, we analyze the Model 3P with respect to the equilibrium quantities, wholesale prices and the profits of the channel members.
4.2. Model 3P
In this model, the manufacturer sells new units through an independent reseller, while she contracts the sales of remanufactured products to a third party distributor. As an example of this form of supply chain structure, Panasonic currently has three authorized service centers, such as Telrepco, Buy Tough and Rugged Depot, and all the remanufactured Toughbook computers are sold by authorized reseller partners. Similarly, we also find that this form of distribution is common in the automobile industry: the manufacturer normally adopts car reseller to market her new parts, while her rebuilt parts are usually available through some auto repair shops and auto parts chain stores. 
	In this model, the third party distributor decides the quantities of remanufactured products, thus the third party’s problem is
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Given the wholesale price () and anticipating the manufacturer’s response , the reseller’s problem is
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	Since the manufacturer wholesales new (remanufactured) units through an independent reseller (the third party distributor), the manufacturer optimizes 
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Proceeding with the standard backward induction approach, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale prices, and profits can be summarized as follows:




To ensure comparison of the interior point solutions to both models, as in Gupta and Loulou (1998), Gilbert and Cvsa (2003) and Savaskan et al. (2004), we impose the condition of , (see Lemma 1 in Appendix C). From this condition, we give the following assumption.
	Assumption 9. The remarketing cost is not sufficiently large or small, that is, .
Assumption 9 implies that the remarketing cost is not too large (i.e., ) so that the manufacturer or the third party distributor is willing to provides remanufactured products (i.e., ). On the other hand, the remarketing cost is not too small (i.e., ) so that the reseller is willing to sells sufficient quantities of new products (i.e., ), which obtained as cores for remanufacturing.
4.3. Comparison of the two models
Based on Proposition 1 and 2, some interesting observations can be made on the performance of supply chain structures. We look first at the differences in wholesale prices and the following remark summarizes our key finding.
Remark 1. The manufacturer always sets a lower wholesale price for new products in Model M than in Model 3P, i.e., .
Remark 1 shows that, compared to subcontracting the remarketing activity to the third party, the manufacturer usually sets a lower wholesale price when she makes remanufactured products and sells them through hers own e-channel. she does so for two reasons: First, in Model M, the unit profit from selling a remanufactured product through hers own e-channel is higher than that from wholesaling a remanufactured product to the third party distributor, making remarketing the remanufactured products through the e-channel a more effective method than adopting the third party distributor, as a result, the manufacturer is willing to sets a lower wholesale price in Model M. Second, since, in Model M, the manufacturer obtains higher unit profit, she has more incentives to remarket more remanufactured products in Model M than in Model 3P (see, Remark 2). Said differently, in Model M, the reseller, who sells new products through his retail channel, faces more fierce competition from the remanufactured products. To avoid reducing the reseller’s profit unduly, the manufacturer then sets a lower price in Model M. 
	Having compared the optimal wholesale prices of both models, we now turn our attention to the equilibrium quantities——that is, comparing the optimal quantities of remanufactured and new products of both models——based on Propositions 1 and 2, we offer the following remark.
Remark 2. There is a larger (smaller) quantity of remanufactured (new) products in Model M than that in Model 3P, specifically, ().
	To explain the variation in the quantities of remanufactured (new) products, we first note that, in Model 3P, the vertical competition between the manufacturer and the third party induces double marginalization problems​[4]​; while, in Model M, the manufacturer remarkets the remanufactured products through hers own e-channel. Therefore, in Model 3P, the double marginalization problem leads to lower sales quantities and profits of the remanufactured products than that in Model M, specifically, . On the other hand, since, in Model M, the manufacturer obtains higher unit profit from a remanufactured product than that in Model 3P, she has more incentives to remarket more remanufactured products in Model M than in Model 3P, as a result, the reseller, who sells new products through his retail channel, faces more fierce competition from the remanufactured products and sells less quantity of the new ones, specifically, . 
We are now addressing both parties’ profits of both models, based on Propositions 1 and 2, the following remark summarizes several key differences between two models.
Remark 3. The profits of the manufacturer, reseller and the total supply chain in the Model 3P always dominate those in Model M. Specifically, , , .
Note that increasing the availability of remanufactured products impacts the manufacturer’s profits in two opposing ways. On one hand, increasing the availability of remanufactured products causes the manufacturer to derive more revenue from remanufactured products. On the other hand, conversely, there is cannibalization of new products by remanufactured ones, as the remanufactured product increases, the competition between the remanufactured products and new ones become fierce and the cannibalization effect intensifies, which causes the manufacturer to derive less revenue from new products.
Although the manufacturer obtains higher unit profit from a remanufactured product and has more incentives to remarket more remanufactured products in Model M (i.e., ), the manufacturer suffers from excessive encroachment in the reseller’s market and leads lower profits from new products sold through the reseller’s channel. Said differently, Remark 3 shows that, the profits from remanufactured products is not sufficient to “compensate” for the “loss” from new ones, as a result, . Providing more (less) units sold through the e-channel (third party) means that the reseller’s potential market is smaller (larger) and the marginal revenue from new products in the reseller channel is higher. As a result, the reseller obtains more profits in Model 3P than in Model M (i.e., ). Since  and , the total profit of supply chain in Model M is less than that in Model 3P, specifically, .
4.4. Environmental implications
The environmental impact of a strategy depends on the volume of products in each phase multiplied by the per-unit impact of the product in each phase (White et al. 1999; Agrawal et al. 2011; Thomas 2011). Since remanufacturing can eliminate the returned cores’ disposal impact, and consumes less natural resources and energy than manufacturing new products (Giutini and Gaudette 2003), one unit remanufactured product’s environmental impact is much smaller than that of a remanufactured one. From the above analysis, to explore the environmental implications of both models, we use  and  to represent the per-unit disposal impact of a new product and a remanufactured one, and make the following assumption:
Assumption 10. The per-unit disposal impact of a new product is larger than that of a remanufactured one, i.e., .
We use  and  to represent the environmental impacts of Models M and 3P, respectively. Based on Proposition 1 and 2, and assumption 10, we have the following remark.
Remark 4. Model M is always greener than Model 3P, i.e., .
	The rationale for this remark is as follows: compared to Model 3P, when the manufacturer remarkets the remanufactured products through hers own e-channel, the reseller faces a more fierce competition from the remanufactured products and decreases more new products, which leads a smaller environmental impact from the new products. On the other hand, although there is a larger quantity of remanufactured products in Model 3P than in Model M,   which leads the environmental impact from the remanufactured products is not sufficient to “compensate” for the “loss” of the environmental impact from new ones. Thus, Model M is always greener than Model 3P.
5. Oligopolistic resellers
So far, our analysis has focused on a bilateral monopoly environment that a reseller sells all new units in a retail channel, while all remanufactured products are remarketed through a manufacturer-owned e-channel or a third party distributor. However, in reality, the manufacturer always relies on many resellers that offer new products. To address this issue, we modify our original model to allow the new products are sold by  symmetric resellers, while all remanufactured products are remarketed through a manufacturer-owned e-channel or a third party distributor. 
Firstly, we consider the Model OM where all the new products are sold by  symmetric reseller, while all remanufactured products remarketed through the manufacturer’s own e-channel. 
5.1. Model OM
Since all new products are distributed by  symmetric resellers, the inverse demand functions for new and remanufactured products defined as
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Where  is the quantity of new ones sold by reseller  and  is the quantity of products currently in use that was supplied by reseller . 
Let us use the superscript  to distinguish the results for Model M and Model 3P. Specifically, We use  to represent the profit for the player  under supply chain model , that is, superscript denotes Model OM and Model O3P, respectively. Subscript  denotes the manufacturer, the reseller, the third party and the total supply chain, respectively. Then we can write the manufacturer and the  reseller’s problem as 
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Proceeding with the standard backward induction approach, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale prices, and profits can be summarized as follows:







Next, we consider the Model O3P where all the new products are sold by  symmetric reseller, while all remanufactured products remarketed through a third party distributor.
5.1. Model O3P
In Model O3P, we can write the manufacturer, third party distributor and the  reseller’s problem as
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Using the standard backward induction approach, we can get the equilibrium quantities, wholesale prices, and profits as follows:
Proposition 4. In Model O3P, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale prices, and profits can be summarized as follows:
,




To ensure comparison of the interior point solutions to models OM and O3P, we again impose the condition of , (see Lemma 2 in Appendix). From this condition, we give the following assumption.
Assumption 11. The unit remarketing cost is not sufficiently small or large, that is, .
When there is only one retailer in the market (), both thresholds are exactly identical to those thresholds in Assumption 9.
5.3. The implications of competition
When the manufacturer adopts multiple resellers to market the new products, the competition among them plays an important role in determining the equilibrium outcomes of all parties under both Model OM and Model O3P. In particular, we formulate the following remark:
Remark 5. As number of resellers, , increases, the manufacturer’s profit in both models increases, i.e., ,  , while the resellers’ profits in both models decrease, i.e., ,  . In addition, as number of resellers, , increases, the third party’s profit decreases, i.e., .
	 Not surprisingly, the resellers’ profits in models OM and O3P decrease as number of resellers, , increases. Interestingly, Remark 5 shows that the manufacturer’s profit increases as number of resellers increases. As regards this increase in the manufacturer’s profit, we can interpret as follows: on one hand, as the number of resellers, , increases, seeing the competition becomes fierce, all resellers are more likely to provides a lower price and a larger quantity of new products, which then mitigates the double marginalization problem. Thus, the more resellers in the market, the manufacturer benefits more from the new products selling. On the other hand, an increase in the number of resellers results in an increase in the availability of remanufactured cores, said differently, the more resellers in the market, the manufacturer benefits more from the remanufacturing. 
Our model also shows that the third party’s profit decreases as the number of resellers increases. The reason is as follows. On the one hand, as the number of resellers, , increases, all resellers are more likely to provides a lower price and a larger quantity of new products. Recalling that primary consumer value discount for the remanufactured product is a fraction () of the willingness-to pay for the new product. Thus, the lower price of new products leads to a lower price for the remanufactured ones. That is, an increase in the number of resellers allows the third party to obtain lower margins per unit of the remanufactured product. On the other hand, note that the sequence of our models is the manufacturer announces the wholesale prices of both products, the reseller responds by determining the optimal units of selling, and the manufacturer and/or third party distributor then chooses the units to be sold through the e-channel and/or through the third party channel. Thus, increasing the availability of new products means that the third party’s potential market is smaller and the remanufactured products faces a more fierce competition from the new products. Based on the above, the third party is worse off when the number of resellers, , increases.
Because the competition among resellers increases the availability of used cores, and the remarketing behavior would seem to be a boon for the manufacturer and the third party, one may expect that, as the number of resellers increases, the manufacturer or the third party has more incentives to invest in remarketing, that is, to decrease . However, the following remark reveals this is not the case. 
Remark 6. (i) , , so as the number of resellers, , increases, in Models OM and O3P, the manufacturer has less incentive to invest on the remarketing channel, that is, to decrease .
(ii) , , so as the number of resellers, , increases, in Models OM and O3P, all resellers have less incentive to invest on new products marketing, that is, to decrease .
(iii) , so as the number of resellers, , increases, the third party has less incentive to invest on the remarketing channel, that is, to decrease .
Not surprisingly, the resellers in both models have less incentive to invest on new products marketing, because the resellers’ profits in both models decrease as number of resellers increases. Similarly, as the number of resellers increases, the third party’s profit decreases, as a result, the third party has less incentive to invest on the remanufactured products remarketing. 
Surprisingly, the first part of Remark 6 reveals that the manufacturer also has less incentive to invest on the remarketing. The reason is as follows. Recall that the more resellers in the market, the manufacturer benefits more from the new products selling. Thus, as the number of the resellers increases, the manufacturer cares greatly about the profit from new products selling. But, there is cannibalization of new products by remanufactured ones, which causes the manufacturer to derive less profit from new products. As a result, the more resellers in the market, the manufacturer pays less attention to the third party’s revenue and would not like to promote the remanufactured products remarketing.
The first part of Remark 6 highlights an interesting contrast with the results in Xiong et al. (2013), who find that, to exploit the benefit of remanufacturing, the manufacturer will strategically produce more new products to generate more available cores. A difference that we believe stems from our models’ focus on the competition between the marketing and remarketing channels rather than the production planning of the new and remanufactured products. 
We are now in a position to explore the environmental implications of Model OM and Model O3P. Recall that, since remanufacturing can eliminate the returned cores’ disposal impact, and consumes less natural resources and energy than manufacturing new products, we assume that the per-unit disposal impact of a new product is larger than that of a remanufactured one, i.e., . For simplify, we further assume that the per-unit disposal impact of a new product  and the per-unit disposal impact of a remanufactured product ​[5]​. The following remark summarizes our key finding.
Remark 7. Model OM is always greener than Model O3P, i.e., . In addition, the difference in environmental impacts of both models increases as the number of resellers, , increases, i.e., , that is, the more resellers in the market, Model OM is more green than Model O3P.
As Remark 4 shows, compared to subcontracting the remarketing activity to a third party, it is greener when the manufacturer remarkets the remanufactured products through hers own e-channel, i.e., . However, we find that the difference in environmental impacts of both models increases as the number of resellers, , increases, i.e., . This can be explained as follow: on the one hand, in Model 3P, there is a double marginalization problem between the manufacturer and the third party which leads a higher retail prices and a lower sales quantity of the remanufactured products than in Model OM, That is, as the number of the resellers increases, compared to Model 3P, there is a larger quantity of remanufactured products sold in Model OM. On the other hand, in the Model M, facing more fierce competition from the remanufactured products, the resellers are reluctant to increase the quantities of the new products. As a result, as the number of the resellers increases, compared to Model 3P, there is a smaller quantity of new products sold in Model OM. Based on the above, we can find that the difference in environmental impacts of both models increases as the number of resellers, , increases, i.e., . Said differently, the more resellers in the market, Model OM is more green than Model O3P.
6. Conclusion
Even though many manufacturers, including Apple, Canon, HP and Panasonic, have adopted different supply chains to remarket the remanufactured products, there is scant literature addressing remarketing-related issues, such as remarketing channel structure, remarketing costs and cannibalization problems between remanufactured products and new ones. In this paper, we investigate how the decisions about remarketing distribution channels that are made by the manufacturer and their impacts on environmental performance. Specifically, we develop two channel models, which based on observations from current practice, to account for the strategic effects of remarketing costs, channel structure and cannibalization problems and also provide insights for the environmental performance of these models.	
To generate managerial insights into the issues of remarketing costs and the remarketing channel structure, we characterize the optimal strategies of both parties and derive a number of observations. One important result of our analysis is that, although the manufacturer usually sets a lower wholesale price in Model M, the new products always face a fierce competition from the remanufactured products, as a result, the reseller usually sells a lower volume of new units through his channel. Another important result of our analysis is that, although Model M is always greener than Model 3P, firms may not have an incentive to adopt it because both the manufacturer and the reseller may actually be worse off when the manufacturer remarketing the remanufactured products through hers own e-channel. In addition, we extend both models to the cases where the manufacturer interacts with multiple resellers, as our analysis reveals, the more resellers in the market, Model M is more green than Model 3P.
We do acknowledge a few limitations of our models. First, some of our assumptions, such as the monopoly manufacturer, complete information and zero remanufacturing costs, could be relaxed in future research. Second, to develop a more comprehensive understanding of remarketing-related issues, we abstract away other factors, including product return costs, used-products qualities and reverse channel structures, which may potentially play an important role in a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing.​[6]​ Third, we assume that consumers show no preference between both channels, whereas in reality, consumer preferences may exhibit different distributions.​[7]​
















^1	  Throughout the paper, we adopt the convention of using the terms “refurbishing”, “rebuilding” and “recycling” as a common term for “remanufacturing”.
^2	  In reporting our computations, for purposes of differentiation, we use the feminine pronoun to refer to the manufacturer and the masculine pronoun to refer to the reseller.
^3	  For the clarity of the text, all proofs are provided in the appendix.
^4	  Spengler (1950) first points out that all channel members independently seek to maximize their own profit, resulting in higher retail prices and lower sales quantities and profits than in a vertically integrated channel.
^5	  Although relaxing this assumption increases the complexity of the analysis, all our results remain unaffected. And we also note that, in remanufacturing literature, Xiong et al. (2013) use similar assumption to simplify his analysis.
^6	  For example, Savaskan et al. (2004) shows that the agent, who implements the used-product collection effort, plays quite important roles in a closed-loop supply chain.
^7	  A survey by Jupiter Research finds that 45% of respondents with online access preferred to shop in physical stores because otherwise they “couldn’t touch, feel, or see the product” (Ofek et al. 2011).
